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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890606-CA 
v. : 
JACKY BOBO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, and unlawful possession of cocaine without tax stamps 
affixed, a third degree felony, in the Second Judicial District 
Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant is precluded from raising a claim 
of illegal search and seizure where the appellate record does not 
establish that defendant's guilty plea was conditioned upon the 
right to appeal the suppression issue? 
2. Whether defendant's consent to search his apartment 
was voluntary under the protections of the United States 
Constitution? 
3. Whether defendant failed to assert separate state 
constitutional analysis in the trial court below and is thus 
precluded from raising the issue on appeal? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath of affirmation, particular describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of 
a controlled substance with intent to distribute (to wit: 
cocaine and psilocybin mushrooms), both second degree felonies, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(1) (Supp. 1988); 
two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
without tax stamps affixed, both third degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106 (Supp. 1989); and one 
count of possession of a controlled substance (to wit: 
marijuana) a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(b)(5) (Supp. 1988) (R. 5). Defendant pled guilty to 
one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute (to wit: psilocybin mushrooms), a second degree 
felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance without tax stamps affixed, a third degree felony, on 
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August 15, 1989, in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and 
for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, 
Judge, presiding (R. 29). 
Judge Page sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences 
of zero to five years and one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 44, 46). Defendant's prison sentence was stayed and 
he was placed on probation with the requirement that he serve six 
months in the Davis County Jail. Ld. Defendant was also ordered 
to pay a fine in the amount of $2,000 and an additional 25% 
surcharge for the victim's reparation fund. Id. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 6, 1988, Officers Kevin Allred and Terry 
Gardner of the Layton City Police Department were dispatched to 
defendant's apartment after receiving a complaint about a loud 
party involving juveniles (T. 1). Defendant answered the door 
and invited the officers inside to ensure that no juveniles were 
present (T. 2). Once inside the apartment, Officer Allred 
noticed a horned pipe sitting on a kitchen counter (T. 2). 
Allred picked up the pipe and smelled an odor which he identified 
as marijuana (T. 2). Defendant was then placed under arrest 
(T. 3). 
When defendant was searched incident to arrest, a vial 
containing a white powdery substance later determined to be 
cocaine was found in defendant's pocket (T. 3f 17). Officer 
"TM refers to the unofficial transcript of the preliminary 
hearing which is contained in an envelope at p. 18 of the trial 
record. "R" refers to the trial record. The parties stipulated 
below that defendant's motion to suppress be submitted based upon 
the unofficial transcript of the preliminary hearing (R. 77). 
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Allred asked defendant for permission to search defendant's 
apartment (T. 3). Defendant did not respond, and Allred 
immediately contacted the Davis County Attorney's Office to 
prepare a search warrant (T. 3). 
When Allred informed defendant that they were seeking a 
search warrant, defendant told Allred that he had never said that 
Allred could not search the apartment but simply that he had not 
said that he could (T. 3). Allred informed defendant that 
because he had not consented to a search, he was pursuing the 
alternate route of seeking a search warrant (T. 4). Defendant 
responded that Allred could search the apartment and assured 
Allred that there were no more drugs in the apartment (T. 4). 
Allred indicated to defendant that he would wait for other 
officers to arrive before searching the apartment (T. 4). 
Shortly thereafter, Detective David Nance of the Davis 
County Metro Narcotics Squad arrived at the scene (T. 14-15). 
Nance observed defendant handcuffed and sitting on the couch. Id. 
After determining that defendant had received his Miranda rights, 
Nance initiated a conversation with defendant (T. 15). Defendant 
once again indicated that he had not told Allred that he could 
not search the apartment, but rather, that he had not told Allred 
that he could (T. 15, 21). Nance informed defendant that the 
county attorney was in the process of preparing a search warrant 
and that if defendant consented to a search, it would speed up 
the process (T. 15). Defendant indicated he was in a "hurry to 
get it over with" and would give his permission for the police to 
search his apartment (T. 16, 21). Before searching, Nance 
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contacted Steve Major of the Davis County Attorney's Office who 
indicated that defendant's consent was a sufficient basis to 
search the apartment (T. 16). 
Detective Nance then asked defendant if there were any 
drugs in the residence (T. 17). Defendant disclosed that 
marijuana was contained in the freezer section of the 
refrigerator (T. 4, 17). Subsequently, marijuana was discovered 
in the freezer (T. 4, 17). Additionally, police found a baggie 
of cocaine and a baggie of psilocybin mushrooms in a safe in the 
master bedroom (T. 17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant may only attack the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress from his guilty plea conviction if the 
defendant, prosecutor and trial judge agreed that the guilty plea 
was conditioned upon the right to appeal the order on the motion 
to suppress. The minute entry of the guilty plea hearing is the 
only appellate record document which sets forth the events of the 
plea hearing. There is no indication in the minute entry that 
defendant's plea was conditionally entered. In the absence of 
clear record evidence that defendant's plea was conditional, this 
Court should not consider defendant's attack on the trial court's 
denial of the motion to suppress. 
Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his 
apartment by the police. Consent is a recognized exception under 
the United States Constitution to the requirement that police 
secure a search warrant. Defendant's consent was freely given, 
and the police did not coerce or trick defendant to consent to 
the search. 
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Defendant's claim that his rights under the Utah 
Constitution were violated should not be considered where 
defendant did not support his claim with state constitutional 
analysis in the court below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD ON 
APPEAL TO DEMONSTRATE THAT DEFENDANT ENTERED 
AND THE TRIAL COURT ACCEPTED A CONDITIONAL 
GUILTY PLEA THAT SPECIFICALLY PRESERVED THE 
SUPPRESSION ISSUE FOR APPEAL, DEFENDANT IS 
PRECLUDED FROM ALLEGING DENIAL OF HIS RIGHTS 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 AS A GROUND FOR REVERSAL OF HIS 
CONVICTION. 
On appeal, defendant attacks the trial court's denial 
of his motion to suppress evidence seized by police pursuant to a 
consent search of his apartment. He claims that the search and 
seizure violated the fourth amendment of the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Defendant's claim should not be considered by this Court 
It is settled law that a voluntary guilty plea is a 
waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues, 
including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations (e.g., 
fourth amendment issues). State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); State v. Mclntire, 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). See also State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978) 
(per curiam); State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977). However, 
in Sery, this Court created an exception to this general rule, 
noting that: 
[it] is inapplicable where . . . the plea 
entered by the defendant with the consent of 
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the prosecution and accepted by the trial 
judge specifically preserves the suppression 
issue for appeal and allows withdrawal of the 
plea if defendant's arguments in favor of 
suppression are accepted by the appellate 
court. . • . 
758 P.2d at 938 (emphasis added). The question in the instant 
case is whether defendant's guilty plea satisfied the requirement 
of Sery.regarding conditional pleas. 
In State v. Mclntire, 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), this Court considered a similar issue. After the 
trial court denied his motion to suppress, Mclntire pled guilty 
to several charges. This Court determined that the guilty plea 
was unconditional and was entered freely, voluntarily and 
2 intelligently. Based on those facts and the absence of any 
language "conditioning the plea on Mclntires's right to appeal 
the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress," the Court 
held that Mclntire was precluded from raising fourth amendment 
issues on appeal. 93 Utah Adv. Rep. at 19. 
More recently, in State v. Langdon, No. 880370-CA, slip 
op. at 2 (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1990) (unpublished) (see 
Appendix "A"; Memorandum Decision), this Court found that a 
defendant could not appeal the denial of a motion to suppress 
where there was no indication in the appellate record that the 
plea was conditional as authorized by Sery. In the absence of a 
The opinion in Mclntire was withdrawn prior to publication in 
the Pacific Reporter because the Court subsequently learned that 
Mclntire had actually entered a conditional plea and therefore, 
under Sery, was not precluded from raising fourth amendment 
issues on appeal. State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 971 n.2 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). The State cites Mclntire not as published 
precedent, but simply for its discussion of the issue presented 
here. 
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claim that the plea was involuntary, this Court found that there 
were no issues preserved for consideration on appeal, ^ d. at 3. 
As in Mclntire and Langdon, defendant's plea, as 
reflected in the record on appeal, does not contain specific 
language preserving the suppression issue for appeal. Defendant 
cites the certificate of probable cause signed by Judge Page on 
October 10, 1989, in support of his assertion the his plea was 
conditional (R. 69; Appendix "B"; Certificate of Probable Cause) 
(see Br. of App. at 6). However, defendant's unconditional 
guilty plea was entered previously on August 15, 1989 (R. 29; 
Appendix "C" ; Minute Entry). The trial court's minute entry is 
the only document in the record on appeal that memorializes the 
3 
guilty plea proceedings. The minute entry establishes that 
defendant was present and represented by Ron Yengich, that the 
court explained to defendant his rights waived by a guilty plea, 
and that defendant pled guilty to two counts (R. 29). There is 
no indication that the plea was conditional. Notably, defendant 
pled guilty to two of the five pending charges on the same day 
that Judge Page denied his motion to suppress (R. 7 7-78; Appendix 
"D"; Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress). 
Defendant's claim that his plea was conditional appears 
to be based upon the fact that the trial judge subsequently 
granted a certificate of probable cause (Br. of App. at 6). 
However, Sery requires that a conditional plea be entered with 
approval of the defendant, the prosecutor and the trial judge at 
3 
No plea affidavit was executed by defendant in the district 
court, and no transcript of the change of plea hearing has been 
provided by defendant on appeal. 
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conditional plea pursuant to Sery. However, the record before 
this Court simply does :.- demonstrate that fact. If the 
procedure followed in the trial court was in fact deficiei i t ii i 
producing the desired conditional plea, defendant may be entitled 
to postconviction relief under Utah R Civ. P. 65B(i ). See Utah 
•Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) & (3) (Supp. 1989) (which prov ide that 
a request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest must be made 
within 30 days after entry of the plea, but that the section does 
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In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the 
Supreme Court closely examined the standard for determining the 
voluntariness of a consent search. Review was granted to 
consider whether voluntary consent requires knowledge of the 
right to refuse consent. Ici- at 223. The Court rejected the 
argument that consenting to search is analogous to the 
requirement that a defendant affirmatively waive the right to 
counsel at trial. The Court held that voluntariness "is a 
question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and 
while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to 
be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to 
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a 
voluntary consent." jid. at 248-49 (footnote omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has similarly established 
standards for courts to determine whether a person voluntarily 
consented to a search: 
[T]he prosecution has the burden of 
establishing from the totality of the 
circumstances that the consent was 
voluntarily given; however, the prosecution 
is not required to prove that defendant knev, 
of his right to refuse to consent in order to 
show voluntariness. Factors which may show a 
lack of duress or coercion include: 1) the 
absence of a claim of authority to search by 
the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition 
of force by the officers; 3) a mere request 
to search; 4) cooperation by the owner . . . 
; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on 
the part of the officer. 
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980) (footnotes 
omitted); see also State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah Ct. 
App.) cert, granted, Utah Adv. Rep. (1989); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
_i n 
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Defendant cooperated in the search by informing police that they 
could find marijuana in the freezer (T. 4, 17). 
In ruling on defendant's motion to suppress, the trial 
court wrote: 
The defendant at the time of the search was 
under arrest in his own home by officers who 
had probable cause to be there. He was asked 
if they could search his residence, and he 
did not respond. The officers proceeded to 
contact the County Attorney's Office for a 
warrant to search and the defendant was 
informed that they were doing that. There 
was no force exhibited, and no threats were 
made to the defendant. A subsequent request 
for search was made, and the defendant 
responded that "he never said they couldn't, 
and that they could go ahead and search." 
The defendant was cooperative. No tricks 
were employed by the law enforcement 
officers, when they said they were attempting 
to get a warrant, they were in the process of 
getting a warrant from the county attorney. 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the consent to search, the Court 
concludes that defendant's consent was 
voluntarily given, and therefore, the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby 
denied. 
(R. 77-78) (emphasis added). As the trial court's ruling 
indicates, the court scrupulously followed the Whittenback 
standards and found four of the five factors for determining 
voluntariness of the consent, i.e., no force shown by the 
officers, a simple request for the search, cooperation by 
defendant, and lack of trick or deception by the officers. 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its 
ruling on the motion to suppress because defendant had been 
subject to intense questioning by the officers with the police 
"taking turn[s]" pressuring him to agree (Br. of App. 10). The 
i o 
record, however, mei L . . c^:_>. 
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In .'tef^p-j. - -.-...,*!. :. ;a fc 5 , . • ^ a ^Rpi; . . 2d 
665 (1986), the California Supreme Court refused tu find thai a 
consent obtained after handcuffing a defendant violated the 
defendant's constitutional rights. "[T]he fact that defendant 
was handcuffed when his consent was sought does not demonstrate 
that his consent t n -i search was involuntary " id at 6 7.1 
Unlike Royer and Recalde, defendant was under lawful 
arrest and the police had probable cause to obtain a search 
warrant. In fact, defendant does not claim an invalid arrest or 
that he mistakenly believed he was required to consent. Because 
defendant was not under an unlawful detention at the time of 
consent, Royer and Recalde are unhelpful. 
Additionally, defendant cites Bumper v. North Carolina, 
391 U.S. 543 (1968), arguing that the police engaged in the same 
type of trickery disapproved of in Bumper. The Bumper case 
involved police officers who went to the home of Bumper's 
grandmother and intimated that they had a search warrant when in 
fact they did not. The Supreme Court reversed Bumper's 
conviction, concluding that Bumper's grandmother did not 
voluntarily consent to the search where police misled her to 
believe that they had a legal right to search her home and that 
resistance would be futile. 
However, in this case, the police officers did not tell 
defendant that they had a search warrant. They merely told 
defendant that they had contacted the county attorney's office 
and requested that office to prepare a warrant (T. 3). Defendant 
correctly notes that the county attorney's office cannot, itself, 
issue a search warrant. See State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190 
(Utah 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987). Defendant's 
whole claim is based upon the semantic distinction that defendant 
should have been told that a search warrant is merely prepared by 
the county attorney but actually signed by a neutral magistrate 
(Br. of App. 16). 
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and merely informed defendant of the fact that they were 
attempting to obtain a warrant. Defendant was not threatened 
with a search warrant if he did not consent. It was defendant's 
desire to "get it over with" that prompted him to consent to the 
search. The police had simply stated the fact that they had 
contacted the county attorney's office to seek a search warrant. 
Defendant could only infer from that statement that a warrant 
would issue if the county attorney followed the legal process in 
obtaining a constitutionally valid search warrant. 
Noticeably, defendant fails to cite any legal authority 
which would have required the police to educate him regarding the 
technicalities of the search warrant process. Where the trial 
court found defendant's consent to be voluntary and without the 
presence of trickery of coercion, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's finding. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM SINCE DEFENDANT 
DID NOT ARGUE THE ISSUE IN THE COURT BELOW. 
Finally, defendant claims that the police search 
violated his rights under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Specifically, he argues that the Utah Constitution 
requires a police officer to inform a defendant that he has a 
right to refuse consent to search his person or property. 
Defendant's claim is procedurally barred. 
While defendant's motion to suppress cites the Utah 
Constitution, his memorandum in support of his motion to suppress 
does not analyze or argue state constitutional grounds other than 
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rights in any meaningful way in the court below, this Court 
should decline to consider his state constitutional claim on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions. 
DATED this ,/ ^  day of February, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent, was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Ronald J. Yengich, attorney for defendant, 175 East 400 South, 
Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this .S^- day of 
February, 1990. 
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State of Utah, ) 
P] iniin .t 2 f ! Respondent ) 
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Charles Langdon, ) 
mi. t; it end an t and A p p e 11 a n t . ) 
Before Judge B <«n i • 11 11m \« 11 il i 1111 111 m 
PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession oi ?» 
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, c 
second degree felony. Appellant contends on appeal that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because 
there was not sufficient cause to conduct a warrantless 
search. We affirm the cor.victior.. 
Langdon was charged with one count of Unlawful Possession 
of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute, a second 
degree felony# in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 58-37-8(1)(iv)(Supp. 1988). Defendant filed a motion to 
suppress evidence on April 6, 1988. The motion was denied in 
an order entered on May 31, 1988. On June 1, 1988, defendant 
moved to continue the trial pending an interlocutory appeal, 
but the trial court refused to grant a continuance. Langdon 
then sought to change his *not guilty" plea to "no contest.* 
The change of plea was heard on June 1, 1988. A Statement of 
Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain, Certificates of Counsel and 
Order memorialising the change of plea was entered in the trial 
court record on June 3, 1988. Langdon was sentenced the same 
day to a term •' * fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The State contends in this appeal that appellant is 
precluded from appealing the denial of his motion to suppress 
because he entered an unconditional plea of no contes* A~ "' 
yC^/^&^x 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
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charge. We agree. The present appeal contains no challenge u_ 
the validity or voluntariness of the no contest plea. It 
raises issues only as to the denial of the suppression motion, 
which issues were waived by entry of ax i unconditional no 
contest plea. 
1 his cour t: discussed the general rule that "a voluntas 
guilty plea is a waiver of the right to appeal all 
nonjurisdictional issues, including alleged pre-plea 
constitutional violations" in State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 
(Utal- 1 988): 
This general i: ule of appellate procedure has 
been applied in other jurisdictions to preclude 
appellate review of fourth amendment issues 
where the defendant entered a guilty plea aft-
losing the suppression motion. Because the 
conviction is based on the plea, rather than i i 
the evidence defendant claims was obtained 
unconstitutionally, the defendant forfeits the 
right to press his fourth amendment claim on 
appeal, just as constitutional rights can be 
forfeited b] r a failure to raise them i n a ti mel y 
fashion. 
In Utah this general rule regarding 
forfeiture of appellate review of an adverse 
ruling and pre-plea motion to suppress applies 
with equal force to a defendant who enters an 
unconditional no contest plea, which "if 
accepted by the court shall have the same effect 
as a p] ea of 51 i»J 1 ty 
I£. (citations omitted.) In contrast, the general rule is 
inapplicable where "the plea entered by the defendant with the 
consent of the prosecution and accepted by the trial court 
specifically preserves the suppression issue for appeal and 
allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant's arguments in favor 
of suppression are accepted by the appellate court." Ifl, 
There is no indication in the record that the no contest 
plea entered by Langdon is a conditional plea of the type 
approved in State v. Sery. Paragraph 5 of the signed statement 
recites the defendant's acknowledgement that he understands 
that "if I were tried and convicted . . . I would have a right 
to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of 
Utah* Langdon expressly waived this right to appeal. The only 
880370-CA 2 
reference to an appeal I s a statement by the judge at the time 
of sentencing that, "Even if you appeal, there's no guarantee 
your appeal is going to be successful." This statement is 
inconsistent with the language of the statement executed by 
defendant, his attorney and the prosecutor as to the waiver of 
rights and is insufficient to establish that the plea was 
intended to be conditional 
Because defendant entered an unconditional plea of no 
contest to the charges, he waived the right to contest the 
denial of the motion to suppress on appeal. No issues 
concerning the voluntariness or other aspects of the plea are 
raised on appeal, and thus there is no issue preserved for this 
court's consideration on appeal. 
The judgment Is affirmed. 
ALL CONCZ n 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
kicharc C. Davidson, Judjae 
Norman H Jackson , Judge 
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DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTA H 
THE STATE OF UTAHf 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JACKY BOBOf 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CERTIFICATE OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
Case No. 6346 
Hon. Rodney S, Paq p 
Based upon application nf the defendant and qood cause 
shown, I. hi. .HI ii |„ Iieieby iei L i l i u b L l u t u i e i e a r e m e r i L o i n ...3 
issues in the above-entitled case that should be decided by the 
Utah Court * -::,eais. 
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RODNEY S.^pkGE 
District Cour* 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICLfcL DISTRICT' A* 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE JDF UTAH 
Sl
 M 98S 
. S ^ ; . 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
JACKIE EUGENE BOBO, 
Defendant. 
w. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Criminal No. 6346 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, having come on 
regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court, and 
counsel having stipulated that the matter be submitted based upon 
the transcript of the preliminary hearing, and the memorandum 
submitted by counsel and the Court having reviewed the transcript 
and the memorandum submitted, and being fully advised in the 
premises, rules as follows: 
The defendant at the time of the search was under 
arrest in his own home by officers who had probable cause to be 
there. He was asked if they could search his residence, and he 
did not respond. The officers proceeded to contact the County 
Attorney's Office for a warrant to search and the defendant was 
informed that they were doing that. 
There was no force exhibited, and no threats were made 
to the defendant. A subsequent request for search was made, and 
the defendant responded that "he never said they couldn't, and 
that they could go ahead and search". The defendant was 
FILMED 
cooperative. No tricks were employed by the law enforcement 
officers, when they said they were attempting to get a warrant, 
they were in the process of getting a warrant from the county 
attorney. 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the consent to search, the Court concludes that 
defendant's consent was voluntarily given, and therefore, the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. 
DATED this )S>*\ day of August, A.D., 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Ruling on the day of August, 1989, postage 
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Ron Yengich 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
William McGuire 
Davis County Attorney's Office 
Courthouse Building 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Deputy Clerk 
